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________________ 
 
OPINION  
________________ 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 Section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968, creates a private right of action for a plaintiff that “is 
injured in his [or her] business or property” as a result of 
conduct that is proscribed by the statute.  In RJR Nabisco, Inc. 
v. European Community, the Supreme Court determined that, 
although a litigant may file a civil suit against parties for 
racketeering activity committed abroad, § 1964(c)’s private 
right of action is only available to a litigant that can “allege and 
prove a domestic injury to its business or property.”1   
 In this case of first impression for this court, we must 
decide whether Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to establish that 
they suffered a domestic injury under § 1964(c).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment that they have not. 
I. 
A. Factual Background  
 Plaintiffs Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng are co-
founders of ChinaWhys, an investigations firm that assists 
foreign companies doing business in China with American 
anti-bribery regulations compliance.  Although Plaintiffs 
resided in Beijing during the events alleged in their complaint, 
much of ChinaWhys’ business was conducted with American 
companies.   
 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, GlaxoSmithKline plc 
(“GSK PLC”) and GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK LLC”), 
engaged in widespread bribery in China in order to obtain 
improper commercial advantages and that they did so with the 
approval of Mark Reilly.  Reilly was the Chief Executive 
Officer of GlaxoSmithKline Investment Co., Ltd. (“GSK 
China”).  GlaxoSmithKline is a multinational healthcare 
                                              
1 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016). 
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company that has offices in England and the United States.  
Sometime in 2011, a whistleblower who had worked for 
Defendants sent Chinese regulators correspondence accusing 
GlaxoSmithKline of bribery.  Those allegations of corruption 
included a claim that GSK China maintained a policy of paying 
off doctors to increase sales.  Thereafter, Defendants tried to 
uncover the whistleblower’s identity. 
 As part of the ensuing inquiry, Humphrey and Yingzeng 
met with Reilly and other members of GSK China’s senior 
management in GSK China’s Shanghai office to discuss 
GlaxoSmithKline’s internal investigation into the source of the 
whistleblower reports.  According to Plaintiffs, GSK China 
representatives told ChinaWhys that it believed Vivian Shi, a 
GSK China employee who had been fired, orchestrated a 
“smear campaign” against GlaxoSmithKline by falsely 
accusing the pharmaceutical company of engaging in corrupt 
practices.  ChinaWhys agreed to conduct a background 
investigation of Shi in what Plaintiffs describe as an attempt to 
limit the “efficacy of her extortion.”2  The details of that 
understanding were memorialized in a “Consultancy 
Agreement.”3  That agreement provided that, among other 
things, the arrangement was to be governed by Chinese law and 
that all disputes arising out of, or in connection to, it were 
subject to arbitration in China.4   
 GlaxoSmithKline later learned of additional 
whistleblower emails and GSK China asked ChinaWhys to 
also identify the source of those communications.  In addition, 
GSK China personnel asked ChinaWhys to investigate certain 
Chinese agencies to find out who was conducting the 
investigation into GSK China’s alleged misconduct. 
 In July 2013, Plaintiffs were arrested when police raided 
ChinaWhys’ Shanghai office and Plaintiffs’ Beijing home.  
The arrests resulted in Plaintiffs’ conviction and imprisonment.  
They were deported from China upon their release from prison. 
 Reilly was subsequently convicted of bribing 
physicians and was also imprisoned and deported from China 
upon his release.  The Chinese government fined GSK PLC 
$492 million for its bribery practices in the region, and GSK 
                                              
2 Plaintiffs’ Br. 13, 16.  
3 Joint App’x A69.  
4 Joint App’x A74. 
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PLC entered a settlement agreement with the United States 
Securities Exchange Commission.   
 Plaintiffs brought this suit in the United States District 
Court, alleging, inter alia, RICO claims and pendent state law 
claims.  GSK China was not named as a party.5  Plaintiffs 
contend that their business was “destroyed and their 
prospective business ventures eviscerated” as a result of 
Defendants’ misconduct.6  They also contended that “GSK 
officials” knew that the accusations of corruption were true and 
that the bribery had been carried out at Reilly’s direction.     
 Defendants moved to compel arbitration, or, in the 
alternative, to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  They argued that subject-matter jurisdiction was 
lacking because, even though Plaintiffs may have had 
numerous clients in the United States, their alleged injuries 
were foreign because Plaintiffs’ business was in China, their 
only offices were in China, no work was done outside of China, 
Plaintiffs resided in China, and because any destruction of 
Plaintiffs’ business occurred while Plaintiffs were imprisoned 
in China by Chinese authorities.  The District Court agreed and 
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  This timely appeal 
followed.      
B. Legal Background    
 RICO “creates a private civil cause of action that allows 
‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 to sue in federal district court . . . .”7  
                                              
5 GSK China was not named a defendant even though it is the 
arm of GlaxoSmithKline that ChinaWhys entered into the 
Consultancy Agreement with.  Moreover, as the District 
Court observed, “all of Plaintiffs’ contacts were with 
employees of either GSK China or GSK Pte Ltd., a 
Singaporean entity, and none were with Defendants.  From 
the complaint, it is apparent that it was GSK China employees 
and GSK China’s CEO who requested that Plaintiffs 
investigate Shi . . . .”  Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC., 
No. CV 16-5924, 2017 WL 4347587, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 
2017).  The decision not to name GSK China as a defendant 
is likely an attempt to downplay ties to China.   
6 Plaintiffs’ Br. 8. 
7 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).  
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A successful plaintiff may “recover threefold the damages. . . 
.”8   
 RICO is implicated when defendants have engaged in a 
“pattern of racketeering activity.”9  That pattern consists of 
certain statutorily defined predicate acts “encompass[ing] 
dozens of state and federal offenses” “that together 
demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal 
activity.”10  The statute “sets forth four specific prohibitions 
aimed at different ways in which a pattern of racketeering 
activity may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate a[n] 
enterprise[’s]” criminal misconduct.11  Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants violated two of those prohibitions—§§ 1962(c) and 
(d).  Section 1962(c) proscribes participating in the conduct of 
an interstate enterprise’s affairs through a “pattern of 
racketeering activity,”12 which RICO defines as “at least two 
acts of racketeering activity.”13  Section 1962(d) makes it 
unlawful to conspire to violate subsections (a) through (c).14   
                                              
8 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
9 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
10 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2096–97.  
11 Id. at 2097 (brackets in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
12 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). 
14 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962).  18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who 
has received any income derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity or through collection of an unlawful 
debt in which such person has participated as 
a principal within the meaning of section 2, 
title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, 
directly or indirectly, any part of such 
income, or the proceeds of such income, in 
acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise 
which is engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
A purchase of securities on the open market 
for purposes of investment, and without the 
intention of controlling or participating in the 
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 To prove a violation under §1962(c), Plaintiffs must 
show: 
(1) that two or more persons agreed to conduct 
or to participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the 
defendant was a party to or member of that 
agreement; and (3) that the defendant joined 
                                              
control of the issuer, or of assisting another 
to do so, shall not be unlawful under this 
subsection if the securities of the issuer held 
by the purchaser, the members of his 
immediate family, and his or their 
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering 
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt 
after such purchase do not amount in the 
aggregate to one percent of the outstanding 
securities of any one class, and do not confer, 
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one 
or more directors of the issuer. 
 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person 
through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise 
which is engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, 
to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to 
conspire to violate any of the provisions of 
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
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the agreement or conspiracy knowing of its 
objective to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.15 
  To establish liability pursuant to § 1962(c), a plaintiff 
must establish the existence of an enterprise that exists 
“separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which [the 
enterprise] engages.”16  RICO defines “enterprise” as “any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity.”17  Plaintiffs can show the presence 
of an enterprise by pointing to a “group of persons associated 
together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of 
conduct.”18   
 The complaint alleges that the enterprise here is an 
association of, inter alia, Defendants, “others convicted of 
crimes related to GSK activities,” “and other countries who 
accepted bribes and kickbacks from GSK.”19  Plaintiffs further 
allege that Defendants participated in the following 
racketeering activity:  mail fraud; wire fraud; obstruction of a 
criminal investigation; tampering with witnesses; retaliating 
against a witness, victim, or an informant; use of interstate 
facilities to conduct unlawful activity; and money laundering.20  
Plaintiffs contend they lost their business as a result of these 
alleged predicate racketeering acts.21     
 In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court considered 
“whether RICO applies extraterritorially—that is, to events 
                                              
15 United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 207 (3d Cir. 
2014) (citation omitted); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (“A violation of § 1962(c) . . . 
requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern 
(4) of racketeering activity.”). 
16 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 
18 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. 
19 Joint App’x A54. 
20 Joint App’x A56.  
21 Joint App’x A59. 
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occurring and injuries suffered outside the United States.”22  
The relevant inquiry involves two separate questions:  first, 
whether RICO’s substantive provisions apply to extraterritorial 
conduct, and second, whether RICO’s private right of action 
affords relief for “injuries that are suffered” outside the United 
States. 23   
The Court explained that “[a]bsent clearly expressed 
congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be 
construed to have only domestic application.”24  This 
presumption against extraterritoriality “avoid[s] the 
international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied 
to conduct in foreign countries[.]”25  It also ensures that 
Congress—rather than the judiciary—is responsible for 
navigating the “delicate field of international relations.”26  
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that RICO can reach 
extraterritorial conduct.27  However, the Court held that 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(c) does not allow recovery for injuries suffered 
in foreign territories.28  The Court explained that “[n]othing in 
§ 1964(c) provides a clear indication that Congress intended to 
create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of 
the United States.”29  Thus, although RICO creates a cause of 
action for misconduct committed abroad, § 1964(c) requires a 
“domestic injury.”   
 However, since the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco had 
waived their claims for domestic injuries,30 the Court did not 
need to explain how courts should determine whether an 
alleged injury has been suffered domestically or abroad.31  
Moreover, as the District Court observed here, there is a dearth 
                                              
22 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2096.  
23 Id. at 2099 (emphasis added).  
24 Id. (citation omitted). 
25 Id. (citations omitted).  
26 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 
1664 (2013). 
27 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2103. 
28 See id. at 2106. 
29 Id. at 2108. 
30 Id. at 2111.  
31 Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“The Supreme Court did not explain, however, how to 
determine whether an alleged injury is domestic or foreign.”).  
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of case law grappling with the RJR Nabisco decision.32  In 
addition, those courts that have considered whether an alleged 
injury was suffered in the United States have applied varying 
standards.33  Thus, there is no consensus on what specific 
factors must be considered when deciding whether an injury is 
domestic or foreign. 
 RJR Nabisco did advise courts to proceed cautiously 
when deciding if RICO plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient 
domestic injury to recover under § 1964(c).  “[P]roviding a 
private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for 
international friction beyond that presented by merely applying 
U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”34  The Court 
observed that the domestic injury requirement promotes 
comity and avoids international friction because it, inter alia, 
creates less of an opportunity for litigants in foreign countries 
to bypass those territories’ “less generous remedial 
schemes.”35  The Supreme Court also warned that allowing 
litigants who are abroad to sidestep foreign remedies only to 
seek those available under domestic law would upset the 
balance of competing considerations embodied in the laws of 
foreign countries.36  The Court cautioned that “the need to 
enforce the presumption [against extraterritoriality] is at its 
                                              
32 Humphrey, 2017 WL 4347587 at *5 (“Neither the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, other Appellate Circuits, nor the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have 
addressed what constitutes a domestic or foreign injury for 
civil RICO purposes subsequent to the RJR Nabisco decision 
. . . .”). 
33 Compare Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry 
Co. v. Hu., No. 15 CIV. 10015 (KPF), 2017 WL 3328239, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (considering the totality of the 
circumstances without relying on any single circumstance), 
with Union Commercial Servs., 2016 WL 6650399, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2016) (considering whether the 
defendant’s conduct was intended to have effects in the 
United States).  
34 Id. at 2106.  
35 Id. at 2106–07 & n. 9. 
36 Id. 
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apex” when extraterritorial application of U.S. law raises the 
“risk” of international friction.37 
II.  
 Because this case does not involve Article III standing, 
but rather presents an issue of statutory standing, subject matter 
jurisdiction is not implicated, and the parties incorrectly relied 
on Rule 12(b)(1).  Our precedent makes clear that “[c]ivil 
RICO standing is usually viewed as a 12(b)(6) question of 
stating an actionable claim, rather than as a 12(b)(1) question 
of subject matter jurisdiction.”38  Moreover, given that Rule 
12(b)(6) provides a plaintiff with “significantly more 
protections,”39 and because we may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record and “there is no prejudice to appellants 
in our reviewing the district court’s dismissal as if it were 
grounded on Rule 12(b)(6),”40 we will review this matter under 
Rule 12(b)(6).   Accordingly, we “consider only the allegations 
contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint 
and matters of public record.”41  In evaluating whether the 
complaint adequately pleads the elements of standing, we 
accept as true all material allegations set forth in the complaint 
and construe those facts in favor of Plaintiffs, the nonmoving 
party.42   
III. 
 Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’ 
racketeering activity, Plaintiffs lost “numerous ongoing 
contracts and engagements with U.S. law firms and 
companies”—purportedly destroying “Plaintiffs’ business . . . 
and their prospective business ventures.”43  Plaintiffs thus seek 
redress under § 1964(c).  However, as we stated above, § 
                                              
37 Id. at 2107.  
38 Anderson v. Ayling, 396 F.3d 265 (2005) (citing Maio v. 
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
39 Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 
836 F.3d 261, 270 (3d Cir. 2016). 
40 Maio, 221 F.3d at 481 n.7. 
41 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  No documents were 
attached for the District Court’s consideration. 
42 Maio, 221 F.3d at 481–82  (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
43 Joint App’x A59.   
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1964(c) creates no private cause of action for injuries “suffered 
outside the United States.”44  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ civil 
RICO suit can survive a motion to dismiss only if they 
sufficiently allege domestic injuries.45  As we will explain, 
there is no bright-line rule that we can apply in assessing 
whether the alleged injuries are domestic or foreign.  Rather, 
we must engage in a fact-intensive inquiry that will ordinarily 
include consideration of multiple factors that vary from case to 
case.   
A. The Domestic Injury Requirement   
The District Court recognized that two “schools of 
thought” have emerged regarding proof of domestic injury for 
civil RICO claims.  The “locus of effects” test looks only to 
where the plaintiff felt the effects of the alleged injury and not 
where the injurious acts were allegedly committed.46  Courts 
applying this approach have largely focused upon the 
plaintiffs’ place of residency or principal place of business.47  
Other courts are guided by where the alleged misconduct was 
“targeted” or “directed” and focus largely, though not 
exclusively, on that location.48  Although the District Court 
                                              
44 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108 (“Nothing in § 1964(c) 
provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a 
private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the 
United States.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Humphrey, 2017 WL 4347587 at *6.  
47 See, e.g., Bascuñan v. Daniel Yarur ELS Amended 
ComplaintA, No. 15-CV-2009 (GBD), 2016 WL 5475998, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (“All of the funds at issue, even 
those distributed among the Corporate Plaintiffs, were 
purportedly owned by Bascuñan, and thus, he is the person 
that ultimately suffered the loss.  And as a Chilean citizen and 
resident, he suffered the losses in Chile.” (citations omitted)), 
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bascuñan v. Elsaca, 
874 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 2017). 
48 See, e.g., Akishev v. Kapustin, No. CV 13-7152, 2016 WL 
7165714, at *1–2, 7– 8 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016); Union 
Commercial Servs. Ltd. v. FCA Int’l Operations LLC, No. 16-
CV-10925, 2016 WL 6650399, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 
2016); Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 217 F. Supp. 3d 
1138, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  
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found the former school of thought more persuasive, it 
ultimately did not have to adopt either approach because 
Plaintiffs were unable to prevail under either test.49   
         This case presents an excellent example of why the 
inquiry required under § 1964(c) must be undertaken in the 
context of the specific injuries alleged in a given case rather 
than relying on a one-size-fits-all approach or bright-line rule.  
Plaintiffs allege injuries to intangible business interests, 
including reputation and goodwill.  Accordingly, relying on 
such tangible factors as the location of lost funds, damaged 
property or plaintiff’s residence is not only of little use, but it 
could also be very misleading.  Instead, we must consider 
multiple factors in determining whether the injuries in question 
were suffered in the United States or abroad.  
 Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among the 
courts that have had to apply RJR Nabisco that the location of 
a RICO injury depends on where the plaintiff “suffered the 
injury”—not where the injurious conduct took place.50  That 
may result from the Court’s framing of the issue in RJR 
Nabisco.  The Court specifically framed the question before it 
as whether: “RICO’s private right of action, contained in § 
1964(c), applies to injuries that are suffered in foreign 
countries?”51   
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of 
only two federal appellate courts that have grappled with RJR 
Nabisco’s domestic injury instruction.  In Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 
the court considered whether a Chilean resident suffered a 
domestic injury although he was not located in the United 
States during the events in question.52  The plaintiff there 
alleged that the defendant had fraudulently caused banks to 
wire the plaintiff’s funds from the plaintiff’s U.S. bank 
                                              
49 Humphrey, 2017 WL 4347587 at *6. (“[T]his Court need 
not decide whether the focus is entirely on where the injury 
occurred or if the location of the conduct is relevant, because 
under any of the injury-focused tests employed by other 
district courts, and under a conduct-focused test, it is clear to 
this Court that the alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are 
foreign, and not domestic.”). 
50 See id. (collecting cases). 
51 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2099. 
52 874 F.3d 809 (2d Cir. 2017).  
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accounts to the defendant’s accounts.53  The plaintiff also 
alleged that the defendant or his agent physically removed 
bank shares from the plaintiff’s New York safety deposit box.54  
The district court held that the plaintiff could not allege a 
domestic injury because he was a resident of Chile, and the 
injuries alleged were necessarily suffered at the plaintiff’s 
place of residence.55  Two questions guided the court’s inquiry:  
who became poorer as a result of the alleged conduct and 
where did that individual become poorer?56  “Its holding set 
forth, in sum and substance, the following rule:  a foreign 
plaintiff who suffered an ‘economic loss’ due to a RICO 
violation cannot, absent extraordinary circumstances, allege a 
domestic injury.”57   
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
rejected the district court’s “residency-based” approach and 
held that “a plaintiff who is a foreign resident may [in fact] 
allege a civil RICO injury that is domestic.”58  It noted that the 
district court’s focus on the plaintiff’s place of residence 
improperly disregards RJR Nabisco’s attempt “to make plain 
that its opinion should not be taken to ‘mean that foreign 
plaintiffs may not sue under RICO.’”59 The Second Circuit 
opined that the focus of the domestic injury analysis should be 
the location of the alleged injuries as opposed to the location 
of the plaintiff’s residence or of the defendant’s alleged 
misconduct.  The court explained: “[i]n order to determine 
where the [injuries] alleged by a civil RICO plaintiff are 
located geographically, courts must examine more closely the 
specific type of injuries alleged.”60  It then categorized the 
alleged injury as an injury to tangible property, which “can be 
fairly said to exist in a precise location.”61  Taking that 
approach, the court easily concluded that “[w]here the injury is 
                                              
53 Id. at 811. 
54 Id. at 810.  
55 Id. at 809.  
56 Id. at 813–14. 
57 Id. 809–10.  
58 Id. at 814.   
59 Id. at 821 (emphasis omitted) (citing RJR Nabisco, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2110 n. 12).  
60 Id. at 817.  
61 Id. at 820.  
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to tangible property . . . absent some extraordinary 
circumstance, the injury is domestic if the plaintiff’s property 
was located in the United States when it was stolen or harmed, 
even if the plaintiff himself resides abroad.”62   
 Thus, the court held that when a defendant’s conduct is 
alleged to effect tangible property, the location of that property 
usually constitutes the place of the injury.  Since the plaintiff’s 
money and bank shares were in the United States when stolen, 
the court reasoned that the injury occurred in New York and 
the plaintiff therefore properly alleged a domestic RICO 
injury.63  Several considerations counseled that conclusion.  
The court reasoned that plaintiffs who are injured as a result of 
harm done to their domestically located tangible property are 
entitled to the remedial benefits conferred by a RICO private 
right of action because such litigants “expect that our laws will 
protect them in the event of damage to that property.”64  That 
“expectation [was] entirely justified, especially when we 
consider that a foreign resident’s property located in the United 
States is otherwise subject to all of the regulations imposed on 
private property by American state and federal law.”65  The 
rule thus “ensures that both foreign and domestic plaintiffs can 
obtain civil RICO’s remedy for damage to their property[.]”66  
 Although this approach, which focuses on the location 
of the property giving rise to the harm, is useful where the 
alleged injury is to tangible property, it is not helpful where, as 
here, harm to intangible business interests is alleged.  The 
location of such injuries simply cannot be identified with the 
same geographic certainty that is endemic in the very concept 
of tangible property.  Thus, courts grappling with alleged 
injuries to intangible property have largely tried to trace the 
location of the effects of the alleged injurious conduct to 
determine the place of injury.  In other words, these courts have 
aligned themselves with the locus of effects approach and 
focus on where the plaintiff felt the effects of the injury-
inducing predicate acts, no matter where they occurred.  
                                              
62 Id. at 820–21. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 821.  
65 Id. at 821.  
66 Id. 
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For example, in Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti. v. 
Cavusoglu, the district court found that a plaintiff’s principal 
place of business and the location of its operations were merely 
helpful considerations in determining whether the effects of an 
alleged injury were domestic or foreign.67  There, a Turkish 
corporation “assert[ed] that its domestic business was injured 
because it had . . . annual sales to customers in the United States 
prior to transacting with the RICO enterprise.”68  The court 
held that, even if it were to assume that the plaintiff lost 
earnings from customers located in the United States, it 
nonetheless could ascertain no “domestic injury to [the 
plaintiff’s] business because its business [was] entirely located 
in and operated out of Turkey.”69  The “plaintiff’s injury was 
felt in the only place it had ever been located, in Turkey.”70  
Although the Cevdet court found the physical location of the 
plaintiff’s corporation to be relevant, it did not announce the 
same kind of residency-based rule that was rejected by the 
Court of Appeals in Bascuñán.  Instead, it declared that a 
foreign corporation with “substantial business operations 
within the United States” could, hypothetically, assert a RICO 
domestic injury because the injury could be felt in the United 
States.71 
 Picking up where Cevdet left off, the district court in 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman (Elsevier II) held that, in assessing 
whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic RICO injury to its 
intangible business operations, courts should determine where 
the “substantial negative business consequences occurred.”72  
The court suggested that a plaintiff might be able to show a 
domestic injury by alleging “some effect on Plaintiffs’ 
                                              
67 245 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D.N.J. 2017).  
68 Id. at 653. 
69 Id. at 659.  
70 Id. at 660.  
71 Id. at 659. 
72 199 F. Supp. 3d 768, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“If the plaintiff 
has suffered an injury to his or her business, the court should 
ask where substantial negative business consequences 
occurred.  By contrast, if the plaintiff has suffered an injury to 
his or her property, the court should ask where the plaintiff 
parted with the property or where the property was 
damaged.”).  
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relationships with actual or prospective U.S. customers.”73  
The court, however, found that the plaintiff had made no such 
allegation.  Elsevier, the plaintiff, had sued to recover after it 
sold academic journals to the defendants at discounted rates 
because of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations that they 
were buying the journals for “valid personal use.”74  The 
plaintiff argued that he suffered a domestic injury simply 
because the defendants ordered the subscriptions from the 
United States and paid for them with checks drawn on a U.S. 
bank account.  First, the court held that this was insufficient to 
show that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred in the United States.  
The trial court noted “that it is possible for fraudulent conduct 
to take place in one location, but cause injury in another 
location.”75  While resolving post-trial motions, though, the 
district court found that, as alleged, “48 of the 51 fraudulent 
subscriptions were either physically shipped from the United 
States or were authorized for shipment by an Elsevier 
employee located in the United States.”76  Accordingly, the 
district court reversed course and found that the plaintiff 
“relinquished control of the journals in the United States under 
false pretenses and thereby suffered the effects of [the 
defendant’s fraudulent] conduct in the States.”77  The court 
therefore found that the plaintiff’s harm constituted a domestic 
injury “even if [the plaintiff] were a foreign entity.”78   
 Despite Elsevier II’s earlier indication that, in 
determining whether an injury is domestic, “court[s] should 
ask where substantial negative business consequences 
occurred,”79 its post-trial opinion was based on its finding that 
the alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff’s property 
occurred in the United States.  That is consistent with the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Bascuñán. 
                                              
73 Id. at 788.  
74 Elsevier Inc. v. Pierre Grossmann, IBIS Corp. (Elsevier 
III), 2017 WL 5135992, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017).  
75 Elsevier II, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 788.  
76 Elsevier III, 2017 WL 5135992, at *4.  
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Elsevier II, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 786.  
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Nevertheless, since Elsevier involved an alleged injury to 
tangible property, it is not helpful to our inquiry here.80  
 The court’s analysis in Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & 
Animal Husbandry Co. v. Hu is more analogous to our 
inquiry.81  The plaintiff there was a Chinese company that was 
one of the largest purchasers of soybeans produced in the 
United States.82  It alleged, inter alia, that the defendant’s 
RICO misconduct caused the plaintiff to lose contracts with 
soybean suppliers in the United States.83  The plaintiff claimed 
the loss of much of its market share and that its business 
operations slowed as a result of its inability to receive soybeans 
from U.S. suppliers at the same volume as before the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.84  The plaintiff also alleged 
that it was forced to terminate 90 of its China-based 
employees.85  The court disregarded the location of the 
predicate acts that were alleged and instead focused only on 
where the plaintiff felt the effects of the alleged injury.86  That 
analysis caused the court to conclude that the plaintiff failed to 
establish a domestic injury.  The trial court found that “[a]ny 
deprivation of [the] [p]laintiff’s money was felt in China.  And, 
in sharp contrast to Elsevier, [the] Plaintiff was not deprived of 
its property in the United States[] [because,] indeed, [the] 
Plaintiff received all of the soybeans for which it contracted 
with U.S. suppliers.”87   
                                              
80 Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co., 2017 
WL 3328239 at *6 (clarifying that Elsevier “focused on 
where the plaintiff had been deprived of money or property 
[and] . . . found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a 
domestic injury by asserting that nearly all of the 
subscriptions at issue had been shipped from within the 
United States—and thus, that the plaintiff had been deprived 
of its property (i.e., the scientific journals) in the United 
States” (citing Elsevier III, 2017 WL 1843298, at *6)).  
81 Id. *13 
82 Id. at *1.  
83 Id. at *3.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at *11. 
87 Id. at *13.  
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 The plaintiff’s principal place of business was in China, 
all the terminated employees were fired in China, any expenses 
resulting from the alleged misconduct were paid from China, 
and the plaintiff’s business operated only out of China.88  The 
court found that the foreign plaintiff’s allegation that it lost 
prospective business opportunities from U.S. suppliers 
insufficient to establish that the plaintiff experienced a 
domestic injury because such a claim, without more, “is far too 
attenuated to suffice as a domestic injury under RICO.”89  For 
these reasons, the Dandong court ultimately held that 
“[r]egardless of where the conspirators’ conduct took place, 
[the p]laintiff’s injury was felt in China, the only place its 
business had ever been located.”90  Although other courts have 
reached similar results,91 Dandong’s approach to determining 
the location of the alleged injury is particularly helpful because 
it is nuanced and the court considered the totality of the 
circumstances without relying on any single circumstance.  
 As we will explain, a focus upon where the alleged 
injuries were felt best guides our inquiry.  However, unlike 
courts that have taken this “locus of effects” approach, we do 
not view a plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business 
as detemintive.  Although it will almost always be an important 
                                              
88 Id. at *14.  
89 Id. at *13. 
90 Id. at *14.   
91 In City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Ablyazov for example, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant (who was the former 
mayor) stole city funds and invested those funds in New York 
City real estate projects.  226 F. Supp. 3d 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y 
2016).  The court held that even though the mayor and his co-
conspirators used the funds in the United States, the plaintiff 
did not suffer a domestic injury.  Id. at 284.  In other words, 
because the plaintiff suffered economic harm to its business, 
the place of injury was “the state of plaintiff’s residence, and 
foreign corporations are recognized to reside either in their 
principal place of business or their place of incorporation.”  
Id. at 282 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  Unlike 
Plaintiffs here, the plaintiff in City of Almaty alleged no 
additional contacts with the United States.  The case therefore 
offers limited guidance here.  
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factor, allegations in a given case will ususally necessitate 
consideration of additional factors as well.  
B. Merits  
 With this background as our guide, we must determine 
if Plaintiffs here have alleged a plausible domestic injury under 
§ 1964(c).  We begin with RJR Nabisco’s clear command:  the 
analysis of whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury 
must focus principally on where the plaintiff has suffered the 
alleged injury.92  “Nothing in § 1964(c) provides a clear 
indication that Congress intended to create a private right of 
action for injuries suffered outside of the United States.”93  
 As noted above, the Court in RJR Nabisco cautioned 
against applying U.S. law in the absence of a domestic injury 
for the substantial practical and policy reasons the Court 
explained.  Thus, we must decide if Plaintiffs’ alleged domestic 
injuries justify allowing a civil remedy under RICO.  There 
may well be cases where plaintiffs do, in fact, suffer some 
injury in the United States and courts must determine whether 
those domestic injuries are sufficient to justify application of 
domestic law despite the concerns the Supreme Court has 
explained.  As with any standard that is not susceptible to 
mechanical application, “few answers will be written in black 
and white.”94  We therefore appreciate that some cases will be 
so close that courts may have to split jurisdictional hairs to 
determine if a domestic injury has been alleged.  As we 
explain, the Plaintiffs here have not really alleged any domestic 
injury, so we have no trouble concluding that they have not 
alleged a sufficient injury to defeat that presumption and justify 
the extraterritorial application of domestic law.   
 Given the intangible nature of the alleged injuries here, 
our inquiry must focus primarily upon where the effects of the 
predicate acts were experienced.  This will better allow for 
appropriate consideration of the nuanced nature of intangible 
interests.  
 Whether an alleged injury to an intangible interest was 
suffered domestically is a particularly fact-sensitive question 
requiring consideration of multiple factors.  These include, but 
are not limited to, where the injury itself arose; the location of 
                                              
92RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108.  
93 Id. 
94 Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 
(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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the plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business; where 
any alleged services were provided; where the plaintiff 
received or expected to receive the benefits associated with 
providing such services; where any relevant business 
agreements were entered into and the laws binding such 
agreements; and the location of the activities giving rise to the 
underlying dispute. 
As we have already explained, the applicable factors 
depend on the plaintiff’s allegations; no one factor is 
presumptively dispositive.95   A domestic injury under § 
1964(c) is found where the relevant factors, appropriately 
weighed, establish that the alleged harm was suffered in the 
United States.96 Although they have rarely done so explicitly, 
the courts that have applied RJR Nabisco—including the 
District Court here—have largely engaged in this kind of 
multi-factor inquiry.97   
Applying these principles to the allegations here, we 
have no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs have not alleged a 
domestic injury.  Rather, it is clear that the alleged injuries 
were suffered in China.  As the District Court noted, at all 
relevant times, Plaintiffs lived in China; had their principal 
place of business in China; provided services in China (albeit 
to some American companies – but even they were operating 
in China); entered the Consultancy Agreement in China and 
agreed to have Chinese law govern it;98 met with Defendants’ 
                                              
95 See, e.g., Bascuñán, 874 F.3d at 824 (noting that “[a] 
plaintiff’s residence may often be relevant—perhaps even 
dispositive—in determining whether certain types of business 
or property injuries constitute a domestic injury”); Dandong, 
2017 WL 3328239, at *13–14 (considering a plethora of 
factors to determine whether the alleged intangible injuries 
constitute a domestic injury).  
96 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108 (“Nothing in § 1964(c) 
provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a 
private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the 
United States.”).  
97 See, e.g., Dandong, 2017 WL 3328239 at *13–14; Tatung 
Co., Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1155–56. 
98 We recognize that our review of a motion to dismiss is 
generally limited to the face of the complaint and documents 
attached to it.  However, we may consider the Consultancy 
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representatives only in China; and themselves indicated on the 
civil cover sheet that the underlying incident arose in China.99  
“[C]ompanies came to [ChinaWhys] when they sought to do 
business in China.”100  Plaintiffs have not alleged that they 
possess offices, assets, or any other property in the United 
States.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged a domestic injury 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), even though they do allege 
loss of goodwill and some unidentified number of actual and 
prospective U.S. customers.101  To the extent that these 
intangible assets were injured, it is not enough to overcome the 
Supreme Court’s caution against extraterritorial application of 
domestic law in RJR Nabisco.  Consequently, the District 
Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.   
Dismissal of those claims is consistent with RJR 
Nabisco’s policy considerations.  As noted earlier, the 
Supreme Court cautioned against the risks of “international 
friction” associated with allowing foreign entities to “bypass” 
potentially “less generous remedial schemes” available in their 
home jurisdictions and pursue treble damages for injuries 
suffered abroad through civil RICO actions in the United 
States.102  Plaintiffs seek redress here for Defendants’ alleged 
racketeering activity although Plaintiffs were prosecuted and 
imprisoned in China.  “Allowing [Plaintiff’s] RICO claims to 
                                              
Agreement because Defendants attached the undisputed 
document as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs 
claims are based on the document.  See Pension Ben. Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d 
Cir. 1993); see also Schuchardt, 839 F.3d 336, 343 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“If . . . the defendant contests the pleaded 
jurisdictional facts, “the court must permit the plaintiff to 
respond with evidence supporting jurisdiction.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).   
99 Humphrey, 2017 WL 4347587, at *6 n.14. 
100 Id. at *6. 
101 It is unclear whether an allegation of harm to goodwill 
constitutes a showing of “a concrete financial loss and not 
mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.”  Maio, 
221 F.3d at 483 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
102 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106–07 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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proceed under these circumstances would be at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s directive that the need to enforce the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is ‘at its apex’ when 
remedies available in United States courts may conflict with 
those available abroad.”103  Indeed, it would be odd to permit 
Plaintiffs to seek civil redress for alleged harm arising from the 
very crimes they were convicted of in China and that arose 
from China’s application of its own criminal laws, absent 
allegations that would give rise to a domestic injury in the 
United States.   
We realize that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the analytical approach that we today adopt, in 
Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp.104  But we 
do not find that analysis particularly helpful or persuasive here.  
There, that court held that “a party experiences or sustains 
injuries to its intangible property at its residence.”105  The 
Armada plaintiff was a Singapore shipping company that 
alleged that the Illinois-based defendant violated RICO by 
thwarting the plaintiff’s attempt to recover on its breach of 
contract claim.  The court held, without much discussion, that 
the plaintiff’s “principal place of business [was] in Singapore, 
so any harm to [the plaintiff’s] intangible bundle of litigation 
rights was suffered in Singapore.”106  It therefore concluded 
that the “injury [was] not domestic, and [that the plaintiff had] 
failed to plead a plausible claim under civil RICO.”107   
 Although the ease with which such a bright-line rule can 
be applied gives it some surface appeal, we resist the 
temptation to adopt it as the law of this circuit.  While courts 
have generally noted that a company suffers economic injuries 
                                              
103 City of Almaty, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (citing RJR 
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107). 
104 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018). 
105 Armada, 885 F.3d at 1094–95 (citing Kamel v. Hill-Rom 
Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1997). Although we 
reject the analytical framework used in Armada, we note that 
it would not necessarily lead to a different result here because 
Plaintiffs resided in China when Defendants are alleged to 
have engaged in the conduct Plaintiffs rely upon for RICO 
liability. 
106 Id. at 1095. 
107 Id. 
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at its principal place of business, few have done so in the 
context of a RICO claim that would extend beyond the borders 
of the United States. 108   Even fewer have done so where the 
alleged conduct had an effect on intangible property.  Although 
a litigant’s residence or principal place of business is obviously 
a relevant consideration, and perhaps a useful place to begin a 
§ 1964(c) inquiry, it does not necessarily determine the 
ultimate question of whether there has been a domestic injury.  
It is merely one factor that informs our inquiry.   
 The Supreme Court anticipated that the RICO domestic 
injury inquiry would not always be susceptible to easy 
resolution.  The Court explained that “[t]he application of [the 
domestic injury rule] in any given case will not always be self-
evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged 
injury is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’” 109  Moreover, we think the 
Armada rule is too inflexible to be useful in resolving cases 
where the nature of the injured property interest is not “self-
evident.”110   
 Armada’s residency-based rule also effectively 
precludes all foreign plaintiffs alleging intangible injuries from 
recovering under § 1964(c) regardless of their alleged 
connection with the United States.  “It cannot be the case that 
the mere fact that a loss is economic means that foreign 
corporations are unable to avail themselves of the protections 
of civil RICO, even in cases where all of the actions causing 
the injury took place in the United States.”111  There is no 
evidence that Congress meant to so preclude foreign 
corporations from the protection offered by § 1964(c) and 
doing so conflicts with the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enterprises.”112   
 We next address Plaintiffs’ contention that, 
notwithstanding factors supporting a finding that the alleged 
                                              
108 See, e.g., id. (collecting cases); see also Global Fin. Corp. 
v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 485 (N.Y. 1999) (“When an 
alleged injury is purely economic, the place of injury usually 
is where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic 
impact of the loss.”). 
109 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111.  
110 Id.   
111 Tatung Co., Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1155.  
112 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2104.   
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injury was foreign, they have nonetheless alleged a domestic 
injury because “the alleged underlying RICO conduct plainly 
was both targeted at, and was intended to have substantial 
effects in, the United States.”113  We disagree.  
 As we mentioned at the outset, a minority of courts have 
suggested that a plaintiff can show that it has suffered a 
domestic injury by merely pointing to misconduct that 
occurred in, or was directed to, the United States.  However, 
those cases are also not helpful here and do not establish the 
domestic injury that Plaintiffs claim.  Plaintiffs contend 
Akishev v. Kapustin114 relied on this so-called “location of the 
injury-inducing conduct” test.115 The plaintiffs there were 
citizens of multiple foreign countries who were fraudulently 
induced to make online purchases of used cars from the 
defendant’s U.S. dealership.116  The plaintiffs alleged no other 
connection to the United States.  The court found that the 
location of the fraudulent conduct was an important factor in 
determining whether there was a “domestic injury,” because 
the case arose in the context of an online sale.   The court 
reasoned that “[i]f [the] plaintiffs [had] traveled to the United 
States, went to the physical location of [the defendant’s] 
purported car dealerships . . . chose a car, paid for it on the spot, 
and arranged for the car to be shipped to Eastern Europe, [the] 
plaintiffs would have suffered from a clear domestic injury 
when [the defendant] failed to deliver the car and failed to 
return plaintiffs their money.”117  The case may well be helpful 
when allegations involve the tenaciously difficult question of 
where misconduct in cyberspace occurs.  However, it is of 
limited assistance here.  
 We do note, however, that “the court [ultimately] 
appeared to focus on where plaintiffs’ injuries were felt—i.e., 
on defendant’s United States-based website and, therefore, in 
the United States.”118  To this extent, Akishev’s actual holding 
relies on the “locus of effects” approach discussed above and 
                                              
113 Plaintiffs’ Br. 35. 
114 2016 WL 7165714 at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016).  
115 Plaintiffs’ Br. 32–33.  
116 Akishev, 2016 WL 7165714 at *7. 
117 Id. 
118 Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti, 245 F. 3d Supp. at 657 
(citing Akishev, 2016 WL 7165714 at 8*).  
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does not itself compel the adoption of an approach that places 
undue emphasis on the location of the alleged injury-inducing 
misconduct.   
 Plaintiffs also rely on Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu119 
and claim that it emphasizes that the location of a defendant’s 
conduct is important in determining whether a domestic injury 
has been alleged.  Even so viewed, Tatung does not support 
Plaintiffs’ contention.  The foreign plaintiff maintained a “hub” 
of business in the United States and extended credit and 
delivered goods to one of the defendants within the United 
States.120  When the defendant defaulted on its credit 
obligation, the plaintiff was awarded a judgment through 
arbitration in California.121  The plaintiff subsequently alleged 
a RICO conspiracy to siphon funds from the defendant’s 
corporation and render it an empty shell in order to avoid the 
judgment.122  The court found that RICO civil liability was 
appropriate because “the defendants specifically targeted their 
conduct at California with the aim of thwarting [the plaintiff’s] 
rights in California.”123  The court found a domestic injury 
because the plaintiff had a domestic judgment entitled to the 
protection of United States law.124  The Tatung plaintiff also 
maintained substantial business operations within the United 
States and contractually availed itself of dispute resolution via 
arbitration within the United States.125  Consequently, the 
plaintiff in that case could plausibly argue that its United 
States-based business was harmed by the defendants’ RICO 
conduct and that it suffered a domestic injury because it felt the 
impact of that injury within the United States.   
 Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon Union Commercial 
Services. Ltd. v. FCA International Operations LLC’s 
suggestion that a plaintiff could allege a domestic injury under 
RICO by simply pointing to injurious conduct intended to 
                                              
119 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  
120 Id. at 1155. 
121 Id. at 1156.  
122 Id. at 1158. 
123 Id. at 1157. 
124 Id. at 1156. 
125 Id. at 1155–56. 
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produce effects in the United States.126  They contend that “the 
alleged underlying RICO conduct [here] plainly was both 
targeted at, and was intended to have substantial effects in, the 
United States” because “[a] central goal of the alleged 
racketeering conduct was to avoid detection and further 
sanctions from U.S. regulators and criminal authorities . . . .”127  
In Union Commercial, the court relied upon cases decided in 
the context of antitrust law and concluded that courts must ask 
“whether a defendant’s conduct is intended to or has produced 
‘substantial effects’ in the United States.”128, 129  The court 
found that the plaintiff suffered no “domestic injury” because 
the “defendants’ alleged conduct was directed at, and any 
effects were felt by, plaintiff’s business or property interests 
outside of the United States.”130   Here again, even though the 
court emphasized the nature of the defendant’s conduct, it 
focused on the fact that the effects of the alleged harm were 
felt outside the United States. 
 Given the numerous factors we have discussed that 
converge to paint a picture of an injury in China and not in the 
United States, the individual circumstances that Plaintiffs rely 
on cannot establish a domestic injury.   
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
126 No. 16-CV-10925, 2016 WL 6650399, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Nov. 10, 2016).  
127 Plaintiffs’ Br. 35. 
128 Union Commercial Servs. Ltd., 2016 WL 6650399 at *4.  
129 RJR Nabisco observed that “[t]here is good reason not to 
interpret § 1964(c) to cover foreign injuries just because the 
Clayton Act[, a federal antitrust statute,] does so.”  RJR 
Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2109.  First, the Clayton Act explicitly 
authorizes foreign entities to bring suit under the statute.  Id.  
Further, and as the Court described in F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 excludes from the 
reach of antitrust laws “most conduct that ‘causes only 
foreign injury.’”  RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2109 (citing 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 158).     
130 Union Commercial Servs., 2016 WL 6650399, at *5.  
